ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Crown Copyright documents reproduced by courtesy of The National Archives, London, England.

www.nationalarchives.gov.uk


The National Archives give no warranty as to the accuracy, completeness or fitness for the purpose of the information provided.

Images may be used only for purposes of research, private study or education. Applications for any other use should be made to The National Archives Image Library, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU.

EASTERN

F.O. 371

1947



PALESTINE

Fine No. 4373

pp. 11433 to end

CLOSED UNTIL

61961

1978

PALESTINE

11433 4 DEC

Dated

Received in Registry X (C)

Withdrawal Oppointment of Exploint.

(1) tel the Polisting 3048 of 29/11. (Intel
Letaution obsightion only very short term plans
could be made the most temmediate the needs.
ander bedieve. I Political. (2) Protection of
Butch helpyth and Patients. (3) terminal remainibilities of the merent you's of Palities.
Ancuses appointment of Efficient for Pama.

Last Paper

11428

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

61961

(Minutes.)

Action is on Personnel or to a 0 papers but we should heightime corres. entered to record.

have not yet keen the H.S. Buist Dec. 4

Now see £ 11511 +B Dec. 10

(Action completed)

Next Paper

115-11

32538

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- FO 371 / 61961

OUTWARD TELLGRAM

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 29th November, 1947, 16.00 hrs.

No. 3048 Secret.

Your telegram No. 2143 of the 12th November was considered on November 26th at an Interdepartmental meeting in the Foreign Office.

- It was decided that until the situation clarifies. only very short-term plans could be made to meet immediate Foreign Office needs under the following three headings:
 - (1) Political;
 - (2) Protection of British Subjects and Interests;
 - (3) Terminal responsibilities of the present Government of Palestine,
- As regards (1), the Foreign Office would like to appoint as soon as possible a senior officer with the title of "Political Advisor" to be attached to the General Officer Commanding for so long as he remains in Palestine. The Foreign Office feel it would be desirable to fill this post with one of their officers who would be supported as necessary by experts from your administration. As regards (2) the Foreign Office would like to appoint as soon as possible two officers, one at Haifa of the status of Consul-General and one at Jerusalem with the status of Consul, to look after British subjects and property. It is suggested that both should be from the regular Foreign Service and should each have the interim title of "British Consular Agent". (3) It will be necessary to have some organisation after withdrawal to deal with residual commitments of present administration. Best plan seems to be for Foreign Office representatives at Haifa and Jerusalem to have under their cover as part of their staffs a small cadre of officers drawn from present administration to deal with this works
- I should be glad of your views on above proposals, I should emphasise that these are short-term plans, but even so you may feel that status suggested for representative at Jerusalem requires reconsideration. If so, it would be helpful to have your views as to nature and relative importance of functions of representatives at Haifa and Jerusalem during initial period following termination of the Mandate.

Copies sent to:-

Mr. Gardener. Foreign Office Eastern Department. Consular Department Personnel Departments

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 11511

Registry | E115-11/9375/31
FROM

(U (CAUND).

No.

Dated
Received in Registry

Authorited and followed and specied.

Authorited 2305 of 2/12. April 11/1

3048 (E11433/9373/31) How remarked f 0 6 12/10

agreed with 411 Proposal to attack to Palling
a hind specied on followed advised.

Last Paper

11433

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

See E 11433

Action is presumably on Establishment papers but we should keep trace of it. The main question on which E. bept. are required to advise is, I magning, trining.

Now that May 15 is
the date fried for laying
bown the Mandate, the
Got- of Palestine will
Continue to function as
fuch with that date,
berring

(Action completed)

Next Paper

E1152/

32538

copyright of the Public Record OFFICE, LONDON

| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:-FO 371 / 61961

barring accidents. But it is Strike that events may torce us to expedite our With drawal of the civil admin ist ration and troops and it would briefore be desviable that we thousa have our officers ready by March. They would in any case herefit by a monte or his on the Spot before their duties proper begin

I have minted on X papers

GARG

12.1 ~

INWARD TELEGRAM

enter E

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (O.T.P.)

6 DEC

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cumningnam)

D. 2nd December, 1947.

R. 2nd " " 14,25 hrs.

.

No. 2305 Secret

Your telegram No. 3048.

I have consulted the G.O.C. who agrees with the Foreign Office proposal to attach to Palestine a senior officer as Political Adviser. He would, however, (? prefer), and I agree that this appointment should not be made until near the time of termination of the Mandais, as until that date he will remain in co-operation with us. Palestine officers who will be required to remain in Palestine after the termination of the Palestine Government will fall into two categories:

- (a) those required to asist the military authorities in dealing with administration and local political problems and
- (b) those required to carry on work of liquidation. It is not yet possible to pradict the extent of (b) but it would be necessary that both categories should operate independent of the Political Adviser.
- 2. I see no objection to proposals (2) and (3); except that so long as all other foreign representatives in Jerusalem (including such States as Saudi Arabia and Transjordan) have the status of Consul General, the British representative theme should have no less status. British interests, both Christian and commercial, in Jerusalem are considerable and it is probable that the main by den of clearing up residual commitments will lie in Jerusalem rather than Haifa. We do not yet know whether (7 wher) intervied) U.N. Commission will make their headquarters but they would be vise to choose Jerusalem. I should therefore have thought it desirable at the outset that both officers should have the status of Consul General.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

TP 17

¥\$ \$7

- Mr. Gerdener

- Bastern Department

- Consular Department

- Personnel Department.

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:-

On the public record office, London

Reference:-

On the public record office, London

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group. F6

Class 37/

Piece 6/96/

Following document(s)*

retained in the Department of origin*
transferred to PRO Safe Room*

E11572/9373/31

and closed until. 1998

*delete as necessary

Reference:-

Geni or inc restic RECORD OF

371 / 61961

E11935 alestine 16 CEC 1947 7 EASTERN E11935 19373 19 Formation of orenigh Cwic Quard F.O. Him Hr Reith Attaches Palesine & 2360. Doied 12 Dec Received 16 Dec (Minutes) Last Paper News, Kyr. E11542 Information Policy Dept. References E11086/482/9 Ds. Benns Dec. 17 Le did vuerve comed vie les Bose n'élètimes fiece and (Print)tara 11 of luvel No 82 cores his fair. We will continue E tear wis in wind. (How disposed of) RAHendern -RAHENDERFOON -(Index) (Action completed) Next Paper

1961

34092

RISDEC TOUT

Minutes.

Formation of Jewish Civic Guard.

The High Commissioner announced in his telegram No. 2240 in E 11086/G that he had decided to allow the Jews to set up a civic He proposed to counter-balance this by offering to support the development of local bodies of armed watchmen employed by the Arab local authorities and would issue arms to Attention has recently been drawn in the press to this development by the High Commissioner's statement that only Jewish police were now employed in Tel Aviv. position is now set out in greater detail in the attached telegram No. 2360 from Palestine.

It is important to discourage any reports that we are handing over Jewish areas in advance of our normal plans for withdrawal and the News Department have been asked to emphasise that the arrangements made are purely administrative (see paragraph 5 of "The Times" recently had a attached telegram). useful bit of background on this point, explaining that the Government of Palestine were devolving police work equally in Arab and Jewish areas.

Mews Dept. Might.

12th December 19

12th December 1947.

HB. 137

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (0.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

D. 8th December, 1947.

R. 8th " 19.00 hrs.

IMPORTANT

No. 2360 Secret.

Your telegrams Nos. 3171 and 3172.

Parlismentary Question.

Haganah.

The Haganan has not (repeat not) been "converted into a legal force". It has never been formally declared to be an illegal force, but it is in no way recognised as a legal body.

- 2. The Palestine Government does not permit possession of firearms by members of the Haganah in their capacity as such. During the past few months, no general search for Haganah arms has been made and no such search is intended.
- 3. An arrangement, which will come into force on 15th December, has been made with Vead Leumi; and the Jewish Agency regarding formation of an anti-terrorist guard for an area including Tel Aviv, Petah Tikvah, Remote Gan and Bnei Braq. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of my telegram Mo. 2840 refer. This force will be known as Mishmar, and will be authorised to operate only in this particular area. Members will not (repeat not? be attested as Constables and will not (repeat not) be granted the powers and privileges of Police Officers. Initially, not more than 500 firearmilicences, which will be valid only within the area named, will be issued to members of Mishmar. Firearms will not (repeat not) be provided by the Government.
- 4. The Mishmar will be armed by, and recruited mainly from, Haganah but in other respects has no connection with the latter body.
- of British and Arab police from this area on 15th December is unconnected with the question of evacuating a seaport, and is designed to make more British and Arab police available for duty in mixed areas, especially Jerusalem and Haife, and to take advantage of the services of the Jewish community offered, as protection against terrorism.
- of Parallel action is underdeliberation in Jaffa, where a body of Arab Municipal Police is being formed. Initial strength of this force will be approximately 100, and it will be supplied by this Government with firearms. The exact relationship of this body to Jaffa Municipality has not yet been decided.

E11974 17 DEC

1947

Registry Number FROM M' Recly No.

Dated 16 100 Received in Registry

Participation of British Rubyeds in Palitan righter. Gal action that might he taken,

Last Paper.

11935

References.

(Minutes.)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Ruhlin / rassauliens

Dec. 17

8 Walhusen & (both letters)


(Action completed.)

(Index.)

29470 F.O.P.

B.v. 2/48





CIFL CHBLE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

17 DEC

16th December, 1947.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to state, for the information of the Home Secretary/Director of Public Prosecutions, that Mr. Bevin's attention has been drawn to the possibility that, in the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict breaking out in Palestine after the termination of the British Mandate, individual British subjects might seek to take part.

- 2. Although the exact nature of such a conflict cannot be predicted, it seems possible that it might take one of three forms:
- (a) A Jewish state might be proclaimed, recognised by H.M.G. and its territory subsequently invaded by the forces of an Arab state recognised by H.M.G.
- (b) The territory controlled by a Jewish state not recognised by H.M.G. might be invaded by the forces of an Arab state recognised by H.M.G.;
- (c) Widespread fighting between Arab and Jewish forces might develop without overt participation by any state, Arab or Jewish, recognised by H.M.G.
- 3. Mr. Bevin is advised that, though it was at one time said to be a common law misdemeanour to enter the service of any foreign state without the leave of the King, it is very doubtful whether this can still

It seems unlikely that be regarded as true. British subjects could legally be prevented from taking part in such a conflict unless the act or acts committed by them fall within the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870. Section 4 of that Act, which declares that:

"If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without Her Majesty's Dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty. he shall be guilty of an offence against this Act", would seem to be applicable in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 2 (a)

- Tacceptance or agreement to accept any commission or engagement is the gist of the offence;
- the section contemplates the existence of a "war";
- (iii) the war must be between two "states".

It appears doubtful, therefore, whether any legal means exists of preventing British subjects from taking part, on one side or another, in a conflict which may arise in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 2 (b) Mr. Bevin would, however, be and (c) above. grateful for the views of your Department and of the Director of Public Prosecutions, to whom a similar letter is being addressed.

(Sqd.) B. A.B. Runows

OTHING

73/31

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

S.W. 1.

17th December, 1947.

Confidential

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that Mr. Bevin's attention has been drawn to the possibility that, in the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict breaking out in Palestine after the termination of the British Mandate, individual British subjects might seek to take part.

- 2. Although the exact nature of such a conflict cannot be predicted, it seems possible that it might take one of three forms:
 - (a) A Jewish state might be proclaimed, recognised by His Majesty's Government and its territory subsequently invaded by the forces of an Arab state recognised by His Majesty's Government.
 - (b) The territory controlled by a Jewish state not recognised by His Majesty's Government might be invaded by the forces of an Arab state recognised by His Majesty's Government.
 - (c) Widespread fighting between Arab and Jewish forces might develop without overt participation by any state, Arab or Jewish, recognised by His Majesty's Government.
- Mr. Bevin is advised that, though it was at one time said to be a common law misdemeanour to enter the service of any foreign state without the leave of The King, it is very doubtful whether this can still be regarded as true. It seems unlikely that British subjects could be prosecuted for taking part in such a conflict unless the act or acts committed by them fell within the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870. Section 4 of that Act, which declares that: "If any person, without the "licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or "without Her Majesty's Dominions, accepts or agrees to accept "any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of "any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with "Her Majesty.....he shall be guilty of an "offence against this Act", would seem to be applicable in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 2 (a) above. attention has been called to the following points-
 - (i) the section contemplates the existence of a "war;
 - (ii) the war must be between two "states".

4./

The Under Secretary of State, Home Office.

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:-FO 371 / 61961

exists of prosecuting British subjects for taking part, on one side or another, in a conflict which may arise in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) above. Mr. Bevin would, however, be grateful for the views of your Department end of the Director of Public Prosecutions, to whom a similar letter is being addressed.

Str.
Your obedient Servent,

(Sed.) B.A.B. Bunows.

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

PORRION OPPIOE,

S.W. 1.

17th December, 1947.

<u>Confidential</u>

Sir,

information of the Director of Public Procedutions, that Mr. Movin's attention has been drawn to the possibility that, in the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict breaking but in Palestine after the termination of the British Mendate, individual British subjects might seek to take part.

- 2. Although the exact nature of such a conflict cannot be predicted, it needs possible that it might take one of three forms:
 - (a) A Jewish state might be proclaimed, resignised by His Majesty's Government and its territory subsequently invaded by the forces of an Arab state recognised by His Majesty's Government.
 - (b) The territory controlled by a Jewish state not recognised by His Majesty's Government might be invaded by the forces of an Arab state recognised by His Majesty's Government.
 - (c) widespread flighting between Arab and Jewish forces might develop without evert participation by any state, Arab or Jewish, recognised by His Majesty's Government.
- Mr. Bevin is advised that, though it was at one time said to be a common law mindemeanour to nater the service of any foreign state without the leave of The King, it is very doubtful whather this can still be regarded as true. It seems unlikely that British subjects could be prosecuted for taking part in such a conflict unless the act or acts committed by them fell within the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870. Section 4 of that Act, which declares that: "If any person, without the "licence of Her Majasty, being a British subject, within or "without Her Majesty's Dominions, accepts or agrees to accept "any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of "any foreign state at war with any foreign ctate at peace with "against this Act", would soon to be applicable in the ofroumstances envisaged in paragraph 2 (a) above. Mr. Bevin's attention has been called to the following points-
 - (i) the section contemplates the existence of a "war";
 - (11) the war must be between two "states".

4./

The Director of Public Prosecutions.

it appears doubtful, therefore, whether any means exists of prosecuting British subjects for taking part, on one side or another, in a conflict which may arise in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) above. Mr. Bevin would, however, be grateful for your views and those of the Home Office to whom a similar letter is being addressed.

Sir, Your obedient Servent,

(Sed.) B.A.B. Buros.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group	Fo
Class	37/
Piece	61961

Following document(s)*

retained in the Department of origin*

transferred to PRO Safe Room*

E 11980/9373/31

		/	99	8	
and closed	until	, .		0	

*delete as necessary

1. U/		
& / 		*
		E 11681
		N MED 1944
		1377
Pagistru \ (2.27.2/	Lower way load for somether way load facilities a re- Box La card Moral, a resilily from Lang	9.16 Oil.
Registry 2/198//93/3/	Riseaspointed that Polist	the Caul Lave bein
W. Montell-	admind that they she	rald not non remolede
No. Daves	a remention with I	to preading them
Dated /ll/7. Received on Registry // C.C.	· Box La and Mosul	cavacificans and
in Registry) / / CC.	marilely from Evans	'ordan.'
Lucie 11 on		
Last Paper	Make Mite.	nutes)
F11980	5	- -
References E1101146 3/	Se seponte	nnch.
1.0.1 (a)		1º20/12
1		(* •
	y PP - 1 11 1- 1	
(Print)	VAYIN IN THE COMMANDE	.O. b-w. Worrall Duris
(How diamond of		19 Dec.
How disposed of		572
EO,		
Longer Burerus.		
bangs. Monsell Davis		
M/4.P.		
Feb. 3		
	,	
(Action (Index)		_
Thy My		
15/4/40	,	
Next Paper, 2/99/8/71 48		
12105	34092	

Reference:-FO

61

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDO

Defor Phis tecm, is have become detached from it Af lefone maching one. P.S. attails a ford & CKAM

61961	3			2				
		Reference:-	6	υs	*	w	2	1
CE, LONDON	RECORD OFFICE,	COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFI	_					

I attended a meeting held by Mr. Martin in the Colonial Office this morning on the subject of wayleaves for Iraq Petroleum Company's oil through Palestine. Please see our letter with E 11011/46/G.

The Colonial Office view was that in view of Article 3(d) of Chapter 3 of Sub-Committee 1's report on Palestine any permission for wayleave which the Palestine Government may now grant would not be binding on the successor state. Nor would it necessarily be binding on the Economic Union if the matter were held to fall within the purview of that body. No oil from Transjordan would be flowing through the pipeline between now and 15th May. It was therefore very doubtful if the grant of a wayleave by the present Government of Palestine would do the Company any practical good.

He appreciated however that operations could not begin in Transjordan until the Company had optained a wayleave through Palestine. Therefore, if the Ministry of Fuel and power were satisfied that failure by the Government of Palestine to grant the required wayleave now would seriously hold up the beginning of exploration for oil in Transjordan the Colonial Office would be prepared to consider allowing the High Commissioner to grant the necessary permission (which, incidentally, would involve legislation in Palestine). Before doing so he would require an assurance from the Foreign Office that in their view by granting this permission the Government of Palestine would not arouse an undesirable volume of criticism abroad on the ground that they were trying at the last minute to sneak in some special facility for Anglo-American oil interests at a low price and at the expense of the successor states.

It was left that the Ministry of Fuel and Power would explain the position to the Iraq Petroleum Company and would find out if in fact the Company are proposing to start exploration work in Transjordan in the near future, and if the withholding of wayleave now would seriously delay their Transjordan programme.

Now see letter from 1: Martin to My Ful & Pomer that behind.

(L.F.L. Pyman) 19th December, 1947

p. Ruby fint.

(rities m would come mainly from New York, and I think the views of **5**0

N.A. Dojv. would be useful

HB cely 31)

1. N.A. Digo. for any obs. 2 Mr. Burgers.

It would seem to me that the main point is whether or not the I.P.C. will be in a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the Jewish State of the Economic Board if it negotiates after May 15th on an existing concession or has to start ab ovo. I should have thought that the possibility of criticism was at deast a subordinate issue, and that if there is any we can meet it quite simply by saying that the H.C's concession can, under the terms of the U.N. decision, only run until we hand over the Mandate; that we are letting the company go ahead because we do not want to hold up the economic development of the area and that we are putting assets (in the shape of payments for the concession) into Palestine rather than taking them out.

(F.B.A. Rundall) 6th January, 1948.

agree with Mr Rundall.

ER Depti

Hell yok pp.

List Syran 31/1

F11981 Z1

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF

MR. W.D. MONSELL DAVIS

ETICE.

Petroleum Division,
Ministry of Fuel and Power,
7, Millbank,
S.W.1.

erence:-FO

PD 548/15

13th December, 1947.

Dear Trafford Smith,

We are disappointed to note from Colonial Office telegram No. 3154 of the 7th December to the H.C. Palestine that the Government of Palestine have been advised that they should not now conclude a convention with I.P.C. granting the latter wayleave facilities in respect of oil from their Basha and Mosul concessions, and possibly from Transjordan.

Our letter of the 1st December to Burt was intended to show the importance of signing an agreement forthwith on terms regarded by both parties as satisfactory and the difficulties which would be orested if delay is prolonged. be unfortunate if I.P.C. find it impossible to maintain the Transjordan oil concession on this account.

It is particularly regrettable that the H.C. was advised without further consultation with the F.O. and this Ministry and we strongly support the hope expressed by the Foreign Office (Burrows letter (E 11011/46/ of 9th December) that it is not too late to reconsider the question.

The Palestine Government would appear to have everything to gain and nothing to lose by concluding the agreement for wayleaves with the L.P.C.

Yours sincerely.

Trafford Smith, Esq., Colonial Office, Whitehall, S. W. 1.

(Sdg.) W. D. MONSELL DAVIS

11981 8773 31

With the compliments of Mr. J.M. Martin.

19.12.47

Reference:-FO 371 / 61961

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

8

The Church House, Great Smith Street, S.W.1.

17120/73/47.

19th December, 1947.

Dear Monsell-Davis,

I om writing to confirm what I said at our discussion to-day about the question of way-leave facilities for the I.P.C. in Palestine.

The Palestine Government will certainly be subject to criticism if in the last months of its existence it enters into an agreement of this kind with the Company. The only satisfactory reply to such criticism would be to show, if we can, that unless the wayleave facilities are granted now the Company will necessarily be delayed in starting operations in Trans-Jordan (since it is likely to be some time before they could negotiate with any successor Coverment). Yes under took to make enquiry of the Company on this point, and I understand that you will also draw their attention to the fact that the United Nations plan of partition expressly reserve commercial concessions granted prior to its edoption, so that any concession granted by the Mandatory Government now would presumebly lack velidity after termination of the Mandate, 15th May, 1948, at latest. There is resson to suppose (in view of the past attitude of the Jewish Agency) that the Jewish State, through whose territory (on the besis of the United Nations plan) the pipeline would largely run,

would

W.D. Monsell-Davis, Esq.

would refuse to endorse the concession without extracting something more by way of quid pro quo. If the matter should fall within the purview of the proposed Economic Board, on which there would be international representation, similar difficulties would be likely to arise.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Pyman at the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J. M. MARTIN.

J.M. Mertin

Registry No.E 11981/9373/31

Secret. Confidential. P. Restricted

Mr. Martin, Colonial Office

Mr./ Burrows BAB

from

Mr.W.D.Monsell-Davils Ministry of Fuel and Power

BENT TO

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

vanuary, 1948.

Since you wrote your letter No. 17110/43/47 of 19th December 1947 to Mons 1-Davies about the question of wayleave facilities for the Iraq Petroleum Company In Palestine, we have given further consideration to the political aspect of the question.

on further consideration It seems to us that the main point is whether or not the Iraq Petroleum Company will be in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the Jewish State or the Economic Board if it negotiates after 15th May on ancexisting concession or has to start from nothing. We are inclined to think that the possibility of criticism at best a subordinate issue and that if there is any we could meet it quite simply by saying that the High Commissioner's concession can, under the terms of the United Nations decision, only run until we hand over the mandate; we we letting the company go ahead because we do not want to hold up the economic development of the area and that we are putting assets (in the shape of payment of the concession) ito Palestine rather than take them out.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Monsell-Davi**¢**s.

FOREICH OFFICE. S.W.1

3rd Februar, 1948

(E 11981/9373/31)

Secret.

Since you wrote your letter No. 17110/43/47 of 19th December 1947 to Wonsell Davis about the question of wayleave facilities for the Ira; Petroleum Company in Palestine, we have given further consideration to the political aspect of the question.

It seems to us that the main point is whether or not the Iraq Petroleum Company will b in a better bar aining position vis-a-vis the Jewish State or the Economic Board if it negotiates after 15th May on an existing concession or has to start from nothing. We are inclined to think that the possibility of criticism is at best a subordinate issue and that if there is any we could meet it quite simply by saying that the High Commissioner's concession can, under the terms of the United Nations decision, only run until we hand over the mandate; that we are 1 tting the company go whead because we do not want to hold up the economic development of the area and that we are putting assets (in the shape of payment of the concession) into Palestine rather than take them out.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Monsell-Davis.

1 Bless strong or J. Martin, Fsq., C.B., C.V.C. (B.A.B. Burrows) Colonial Office.

OFFICE,

1947

PALLONING

12:05 22 DEC 28

Registry	Jen mer have be
Number	E12105- 9373 /31
FROM	a + Andia

9 T. Newling

No.

My & Deferrer

Received in Registry & 16

Expaintment of Evacuation officer.

Labinet last week appeared and the opioist white an appeared with the opioist that and the opioist that a description of the three evacuation of the three services of the three services of the three services and ting to among suitable direction for this officer.

Last Paper.

11981

References.

(How disposed of.)

(Print.)

(Minutes.)

attended trus meeting. A draft directive has been circulated that the trusted

(Action completed.)

Next Paper.

E12169

29470 F.O.P.

Ministry of Defence,
Gt. George Street,
S.W.1.

22 DEC December 16th 1947.

Dear Burrows,

As you probably know, the Cabinet last week approved the appointment of an officer charged with the specific duty of arranging for the evacuation of the quantities of valuable (and perhaps less valuable) stores belonging to the three Services in Palestine, to keep a general oversight over those which will have to be disposed of locally instead of being evacuated, and generally to co-ordinate the plans already made by the Service Departments in order to achieve the Government's aim of getting away the highest possible proportion of the stores in that country.

Names for this appointment are at present under consideration by the Minister of Defence, to whom presumably the officer eventually appointed will report. There will also be need to give the appointed officer a suitable directive.

It is for this last named purpose that I am suggesting that you might come to, or be represented at, a meeting which I am holding at 3 p.m. on Thursday afternoon 18th December in Conference Room E at this Ministry, so that we might think about the nature of the directive to be given to the officer, following this appointment. It is as you know intended by the Cabinet that he should be a senior officer whose designation would indicate the importance attached by the Government to this problem of the stores in Palestine, as to which questions are being asked this week in the House.

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

/I am...


COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

1 2 3 N 5 6 Reference:- FO 371 / 6196

I am sorry for the short notice, but the time available is somewhat restricted. If you are not personally concerned with this matter, perhaps you would see that your Department has appropriate representation in your place?

Yours sincerely,

Copies go to War Ofice, admiralty, and Minishy, or Freasury.



(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

1480

I agree with the remark in the third paragraph of Mr. Galsworthy's letter regarding General MacArthur who would be a good choice. I very much doubt, however, whether even the prospect of being a Messiah would persuade him to give up his present job in Japan, which shows no sign of coming to an end or that the U.S. Government would let him do so. Moreover he has other irons in the fire - namely the possibility of becoming Chief Military Adviser to Chiang-Kai-shek, in addition to being the virtual ruler of Japan, and also the possibility (though this is admittedly remote) of his being drafted for the Republican nomination for the U.S. Presidency next summer - which would probably cause him to regard the Jerusalem governorship as affording him insufficient scope.

/1

34092

job.

(P.S. STEPHENS)

29th December, 1947.

Personalitée, (946) on br. Santos. As will be seen from this he has held several league appointments, is a frome. President of Colombia and was the Latin American deput; D.G. of UNREA, and is known to his firmmen and good sense.

Teletie

3/12

His UNRRA appointment was hot an administrative one - he was engaged with Sayre in an endravour to get contibutions out of the hatin. American countries. It would seem a stronger candidate than Alfano.

I attach extracts from Personalities about Hamber Menther New Thomas had any administrative extension base had any administrative extension of the thirs ceptimally qualified for this job. Hamber is understady the Stronger personality of also the better disposed towards the

32

Western Powers. Undén's inchratio \$ Sil in The flake makes him Tather a thou in on flesh or The hument or night make hun a histitity in Jerusalem. Si B. Tenam, to ahour I have Show this hapen, Thurks it verymelikely Under would arcefor sonagents that Judge Landström Should be considered.

passallor

The wei at flag D in R9513 gies lu Stikis annialem vitae. Beme des vote curidu Adding a colon Gener ed toth Sovenor d'Inesté. See R9904 Cillin Branch



My Reference.....

Your Reference

Colonial Office,
The Church House,
Gt. Smith Street,
LONDON. S.W.I.

/8 /4 December 1947

ENB

34

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Bunows,

I have had a personal letter from Sir Alan Burns in which he tells me that he attended an informal dinner the other day at which Sayre (President of the Trusteeship Council), Gerig (U.S. Representative), Berendsen (The New Zealand Representative) and Forsythe (The Australian Representative) were present. The main function of the dinner was to discuss quite informally the appointment of the Governor of Jerusalem.

The general feeling was that the Governor must be either an outstanding personality of international repute, or a well qualified administrator: and that a combination of the two would, of course, be the ideal.

The enclosed list shows the names that were put forward by various members. Some, I gather, were put forward with great hesitation. When Burns expressed surprise that a man like General

MacArthur/

B.A.B. BURROWS, ESQ.,

))

371 / 6196

3.A.B. P.

MacArthur should be considered, since it seemed unlikely that he would accept such a post, he was assured that if the General felt a real Messiah was needed he would at once consider himself the obvious choice. It was thought too that others would be willing to accept the post from a sense of duty rather than from inclination.

Burns adds that he formed the impression that, although the Americans theoretically did not want one of their own citizens to be chosen they would be very glad if they could be urged to depart from this stand, but we would have to press them in order to get an American.

Burns points out that the list is in no way final, and merely the result of a very informal talk. He would however like to discuss it with us on his return, and would like to have our comments on the names in the list, and if possible any suggestions we might have as to alternative names. I believe I am right in thinking that Stucke at least was at one time under consideration as a possible candidate for the Governorship of Trieste?.

I should be grateful therefore if you could let us have any views and comments of the Foreign Office on the present list, and any suggestions you might have as to other possible starters, so that we shall be in a position to discuss them with Burns who, as you know, will be in the Colonial Office immediately after Christmas.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Shannon at the C.R.O. whose comments I should also be very glad to have.

RECEIVED IN C.B.

2 2 DEC 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

Your sincerely,

AMSalsworthy

(A.N. Galsworthy)

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

ARO, Ricardo J., (Panamanian)

CRERAR, General Henry Duncan Graham (Canadian)

FREYBERG, Lt.-Gen. Sir Bernard Cyril (New Zealander)

HAMBRO, Carl J. (Norwegian)

LAVARACK, Lt. - Gen. Sir John Dudley (Australian)

LEWIS, Essington (Australian)

MACARTHUR, General Douglas (American)

MORESHEAD, General (Australian)

RYCKMANS, Pierre (Belgian)

SANTOS, Eduardo (Colombian)

STUCKI, Walter (Swiss)

UNDEN, Bo Osten (Swedish)

OF INC FOBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LON

.

ALFARO, Dr. Ricardo J.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of President Enrique Jiménez. July 1945. Ex-President of the Republic January 1931-October 1932. Born in Panama 20th August, 1882. Was Panamanian Minister at Washington until he was invested with the office of President of the Republic after the overthrow of the Arosemena Administration by the revolution of 2nd January, 1931. He failed, however. to take up a strong attitude in the face of various national emergencies. Had previously held various appointments, including that of Secretary of State for Government and Justice. Was one of the signatories of the Treaty with the United States of 28th July, 1926, which the Panamanian National Assembly refused to ratify, and has, in consequence, acquired a reputation for being too American in his sympathies, which has militated against him with some of his compatriots. Is a lawyer by profession and a man of no little ability. He has, nevertheless, no personal following, and his accession to the presidency after the revolution was due to the fact that he had been elected First Vice-President under a previous régime. He speaks admirable English, and is married to a lady who is the daughter of a British subject and who, although born in Panama, was educated in England. Is a brother of Dr. Horacio F. Alfaro.

On the succession to the presidency of Dr. Harmodio Arias on 1st October, 1932, Dr. Ricardo Alfaro retired into private life for a brief space, but was almost immediately reappointed to his old post of Panamanian Minister at Washington, which he held until Sr. Augusto Boyd's appointment in October, 1936. Sr. Ricardo Alfaro was a Panamanian delegate during the negotiations at Washington, in 1934-35 for the revision of the Canal Treaty of 1903, which he

/signed

signed with Dr. Garay. He was a relentless opponent of the late President J.D. Arosemena.

Returned to Panama in order to contest the presidential elections as the opponent of Dr. Arnulfo Arias in 1940, but was obliged to withdraw from the contest.

Was appointed in June 1944 Chairman of the Commission for Codifying the Laws of the Republic. Was also Chairman of the Committee to redraft the Constitution. Represented Panama at the San Francisco Conference. In February, 1945 became Regional Chairman of U.N.R.R.A., resigning this office in order to take up his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Government.

Sra. Alfaro still talks of England with affection as her "first home".

In October 1946 he was appointed president of the Panamanian delegation to the United Nations Conference. Was highly praised in many parts of the world for his speech at the United Nations Conference regarding international politics between the United States and Latin America (November 1946). Is a strong candidate for the post of Director of the Pan-American Union and is also mentioned as a possible replacement for Dr. J.J. Vallarino, Ambassador of Panama in Washington.

OFFICE, LONDON

118. Santos, Dr. Eduardo, O.B.E.

Of agreeable personality and Born 1888. One of the most influential leaders of French education. the Liberal party. He is a very wealthy man and his fortune is due to his successful administration of his newspaper El Tiempo which is the foremost daily newspaper of Colombia. He threw in his whole weight in support of the eleventh-hour candidature of President Olaya Herrera at the beginning of 1930; was the latter's whole-hearted supporter throughout his Administration (1930-34) and was regarded as the chief of the "Olayista" Liberals. He was Olava Herrera's first Foreign Minister (August-December 1930). He left for Europe in April 1931 and was appointed a member of the Colombian delegation to the League of Nations. In September 1932 the "Leticia" incident took place, following which relations between Colombia and Peru were strained for a period of three years. As a result of that incident, Dr. Eduardo Santos was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on special mission to all European countries, and it was he who, on the 12th May, 1933, on behalf of the Colombian Government, accepted the final fomula proposed by the League of Nations, which gave rise to the settlement which was reached by the signature of the Rio Protocol on the 24th May, 1934. Dr. Santos' appointments, both as delegate to the League and Special Envoy, appointments for Which he accepted no remuneration, terminated, at his own request, on the 25th January, 1934. He returned to Bogotá shortly afterwards and took his seat in the Senate. Throughout the stormy debates in the Senate over the ratification of the Rio Protocol during December-January 1934-35, Dr. Santos withstood the brunt of the attacks of the firebrand Senator Laureano Gómez. He was re-elected to the Senate in May 1935 and took a prominent part in the endeavour to fix responsibilities in the "Skoda affaire" (peculation in the purchase of armaments during the tension with Peru). Although essentially an "Olayista" Liberal, Dr. Santos consistently supported Dr. Alfonso López, prior to the latters inauguration as Presidnet of the Republic in 1934. But, like all the other leading "Olayista" Liberals, he refused to accept a post in the Lopez Cabinet, and became increasingly estranged from Dr. López whose social policy he considered too Leftist. He went back to Geneva for a short period at the end of 1935 and on his return in 1936 re-entered politics. Was president of the Senate and president of the Liberal directorate in 1937. Went back again to Geneva in September 1937. Was elected President of the Republic in May 1938 and remained in office until August 1942. He was faced with a difficult problem in maintaining the unity of the Liberal party, split into its two ways of right and left. In other respects his presidency was marked by sober commonsense and the country made steady progress under his régime in spite of the second world war. It was due to his personal initiative that Colombia, in advance of any other South American country, severed diplomatic relations with the Axis in December 1941. When Dr. López succeeded him as President in 1942, he went off on a prolonged visit to the United States, during the course of which he went to Canada as an official guest. In 1943 went to London as guest of British Council. Appointed Deputy Director-General of the United Mations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in 1944, representing Latin-America.

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:- FO 371 / 61961

(N 15778/10499/30)

HAMBRO, CARL JOACHIM.

Born 1885 at Bergen. He began his career as a teacher and journalist, being editor of the Conservative newspaper "Morgenbladet" from 1913-21. He is the author of a number of works on historical and political subjects and of the Norwegian translation of, inter alia, Kipling, Dickens and Victor Hugo. Elected to the "Storting" in 1919, he became its President in 1926, a position which he held until 1945. In 1926 he was appointed Norwegian delegate to the League of Nations, on which he served in a number of capacities, becoming President of the Assembly in 1939. In 1940 he brought the "Storting" to Hamar, afterwards escaping to Sweden and eventually to London, whence the Government sent him to the United States as a kind of ambassador at large. On his return after the liberation his reputation as a leader of resistance to the Germans (he had indeed played a large though perhaps exaggerated part in persuading the "Storting" at Hamar to reject German overtures) gained him considerable popularity which, however, he soon lost through his aggressive manner, his obvious desire for power and his unsuccessful political intrigues, one of which resulted in the failure of M. Paal Berg (q.v.) to form a Government though with no advantage to M. Hambro. He is now leader of the Conservative Party, Norwegian delegate to U.N.O., and President of the "Odelsting" (lower house of the "Storting"). He is a man of forceful personality, considerable learning and undoubted intelligence, a very competent orator and linguist, and with an international outlook rare in Norway; but he is also somewhat of a charlatan, exuberant and inaccurate in conversation and untrustworthy in his statements. His countrymen have long regarded him with the same mixture of admiration and distrust as the British public in the last century felt for Disraeli, Whom, indeed, he resembles in some respects, being himself of remote Jewish origin; but of late the distrust has tended to predominate, and his political influence is no longer great, even in his own party. His attitude towards Great Britain has been a striking example of "Hassenliebe"; he is saturated with English culture and proud of his relationship to the English Hambros, and one of his sons has an English wife; but he was the archopponent of an Anglo-Norwegian agreement on fishery limits and was always prone to accuse the British Government of "imperialism" in Ireland, India, etc. Latterly, however, the Soviet, rather than the British, Government has become his bete noire. Fundamentally, he dislikes all Great Powers as such and would like to see the smaller nations combine against them. He has been married twice, the second time, at the age of sixty, to a lady thirteen years his senior.

(N 15778/10499/30)

4)

UNDËN, OSTEN.

Born 1886. Minister for Foreign Affairs since 1945. Chancellor of the Swedish Universities since 1937. Minister without Portfolio in the Social Democratic Government 1932-36. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Sandler Government, 1925-26. In 1917 appointed professor of civil law at Upsala. Was for several years one of the representatives at the Assembly of the League of Nations, and deputy for the Prime Minister on the Council of the League. Represented Sweden on the League Council, January, 1938.

M. Unden achieved a certain international reputation as the Swedish representative at Geneva. In particular, he came into conflict with members of His Majesty's Government at meetings of the Council of the League in connexion with the Mosul question in 1925. As chairman of the sub-committee which had to make recommendations to the Council on the report submitted by the commission sent out to Mosul by the League in 1924, he failed to appreciate either the British or the Turkish character. He made up his mind that the British were bluffing and that the Turks meant to fight. In the end, after attempting, without success, to shift responsibility on to the Hague Court, he had to vote one way or the other, and did so for the British. He was vigorously attacked on returning to Stockholm "for having been "manoeuvred into supporting a Great Power for the purpose of "defeating the just claims of a minor State."

In 1926 he again represented his country at Geneva and incurred some odium in Sweden, though not altogether with justice, for having offered to give up Sweden's vote on the Council in order to facilitate the election of Poland to the Council. It was considered that at the pressure of the Powers he had sacrificed a principle, viz., not to allow any increase in the composition of the Council beyond the admission of Germany, which was the object of the meeting.

Appointed to be one of the Swedish members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague for six years from the 7th December, 1930. Appointed by the Council of the League in October 1930 to arbitrate in a dispute between Bulgaria and Greece regarding forest land. Adviser on international legal questions to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and also chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag 1936-45.

Very critical of the Government's press policy during the war and used his influence in Government circles firmly and judiciously in favour of the United Nations.

M. Unden is a cautious, prudent and unexcitable Foreign Minister, and is proving an able helmsman for his country.

E12232

Next Paper.

29470 F.O.P.

SECRET

COPY NO.

MISC/M(47)41

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MEETING ON STORES IN PALESTINE

Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room "E", Ministry of Defence, S.W.1, on Thursday 18th December, 1947 at 3-0 p.m.

PRESENT:

Mr. A.J. Newling,
Ministry of Defence. (In the Chair)

Mr. H. Gresswell,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. A. McEwing, Treasury.

Mr. J.G.S, Beith, Foreign Office.

Mr. J. Gutch, Colonial Office.

Mr. G. Moses, Admiralty. Comdr.(S) J.K. Watkins, Admiralty.

Mr. J.R. McGregor, War Office. Major-General Sir E. Tickell War Office.

Major-General F.W. Festing, war Office.

Brig. Ll. Wansbrough-Jones, War Office.

Lt.-Col. R.J. Dinsmore, War Office.

Mr. E.W. Short,
Air Ministry.

Air Comdre. L. Bates,
Air Ministry.

SECRETARIAT:

Mr. J.F. Hosie.

THE CHAIRMAN explained that the Cabinet had requested the Minister of Defence to give effect to their decision to appoint a special officer who would exercise general supervision over the arrangements for removal and disposal of Scrvices stores from Palestine. The officer had not yet been appointed but a draft directive had been prepared in the Ministry of Defence and the meeting had been called to consider this draft. He proposed and it was agreed that the meeting should first discuss any general considerations which members might wish to raise and then consider the draft in detail.

The representatives of all the Service Departments enquired whether it was the intention that the officer should exercise executive powers and, if so, what form they should take. They pointed out that the arrangements regarding removal of stores were already in operation and that performance of executive powers by the officer would involve duplication of work and staff with a risk of slowing down completion of the task. After discussion, the Meeting were of the opinion that, in view of organisations already in operation the officer's functions would tend to be advisory rather than executive and that he should use the existing organisations.

The Meeting then considered in detail the draft brief. A number of agreed amendments were noted by the Secretariat and have been incorporated in the revised draft directive, a copy of which is attached.

The Meeting, on the suggestion of the Chairman, agreed:-

that the Chairman should submit the draft as amended to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence with a suggestion that it be circulated to the Permanent Secretaries of the Service Departments, the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Transport, for Departmental concurrence.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

19TH DECEMBER, 1947.

DRAFT

REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF SERVICES' STORES FROM PALESTINE

Directive to the Officer appointed to exercise general supervision over the arrangements for removal and disposal

- 1. It is the desire of H.M.G. that the maximum amount of serviceable stores, equipment, plant, machinery and vehicles should be evacuated from Palestine in the time available. In so far as stores, etc. are unserviceable or surplus to Service requirements it is the Government's policy that they should be handed over at the earliest date possible to the Ministry of Supply, except in the case of warlike stores (including ammo.) which are dealt with separately below.
- 2. Your task will be to examine the plans made, the priorities laid down, and the action contemplated in pursuance of them by the Naval, Military and Air Force authorities and to advise whether they represent the best practical means of carrying out the Government's intentions. In this connection you will be concerned, in conjunction with the Palestine Government and the local Naval, Military and Air Force and Ministry of Supply authorities, with every type of store and its disposal whether recovery by the Service concerned for future use, disposal on the spot or to other countries, abandonment or destruction.
- 3. You will have regard in considering priorities for evacuation to the Services' essential needs over the next few years for constructional and accommodation stores of all sorts for housing troops and for machinery, workshop plant, and vehicles; on these priorities you will be advised by the Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply.

You will review the adequacy of the arrangements made for safe removal or where this is not possible for the demilitarisation or destruction of all lethal weapons and ammunition.

Where there is any conflict of opinion between the interested parties as to priority, method or rate of evacuation or disposal of any stores, equipment, etc. the final decision shall rest with you, subject to para 11 below.

4. The following are the approximate quantities of moveable stores excluding vehicles now held in Palestine:-

Navy 5,000 Army 325,000 Air

Force.

31,000 (Subject to confirmation by the Air Ministry).

45

5. A main difficulty in connection with the removal of stores from Palestine will be limitation of transport, including shipping. It will be your responsibility, in consultation with the Shipping and other Transport authorities, to assess the relative priorities of the different catergories of stores competing for the limited movement facilities. It is understood that a preliminary estimate of the quantities likely to be removable within such transport facilities as at present foreseen are:-

lst Aug. By sea 250,00 tons 29th Feb. Overland 50,000 " plus vehicles.

The Royal Navy hope to be able to provide shipping for their stores.

- 6. The disposal of stores other than warlike stores not required by the Services is the responsibility of the Ministry of Supply. You will satisfy yourself, so far as the Services are concerned that there is no delay in throwing up stores, equipment, etc., which are unserviceable or surplus to requirements and in consultation with the local Ministry of Supply authorities, that arrangements are the made for removal or sale under the most suitable arrangements of the maximum quantities of such stores provided that their sale to particular individuals, agencies, etc., is in conformity with the policy of H.M.G. On this last aspect you should consult, as necessary, the local military authorities and/or (until the termination of the Mandate) the Civil Administration of Palestine.
- 7. You may make recommendations as to the possibility of disposing of warlike stores and equipment to friendly Governments (e.g. Iraq) where suitable transport arrangements are possible. You will receive further instructions as necessary from the Ministry of Defence.
- 8. If it proves impossible either to remove, sell, demilitarise or destroy all stores and equipment before the Forces are withdrawn, arrangements for their safe custody should be completed as far as possible. In that connection you are empowered to negotiate with the United Nations Commission in Palestine, or with Successor Governments, for the collection and safe custody of stores which we desire to remove after the completion of withdrawal, or which we wish to dispose of locally.
- 9. You will acquaint yourself with the local arrangements and powers for dealing with fixed assets of all kinds including the arrangements for their custody after completion of withdrawal. You will be prepared to advise in any major issues of policy which have to be referred home regarding the disposal of major assets.
- 10. Your contacts with the Service authorities will be arranged through the C.s in C. Middle East, who have been advised of the terms of this Directive and have been instructed to afford you all assistance in their power in the discharge of your task. You will contact the H.C.

for Palestine matters affecting the Civil Administration prior to the termination of the Mandate. Your contacts with the Ministry of Supply authorities will be arranged through British Supply Disposal Mission, M.E, and with the Ministry of Transport authorities through , who have also been made aware of the arrangements.

11. While it is desired that you should act as far as possible on your own initiative in consultation with the authorities mentioned in para 10, you are requested to report any major problems to the Ministry of Defence for decision on matters of general policy or priority. You are also asked to furnish to the Minister of Defence, for the information of the Government, monthly reports of the progress made, furnishing copies to the above - mentioned authorities.

Minister of Defence.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

No. [12232/9373/3/ Dear Stapleton, 30 da December, 1947.29

Confidential. Restricted.

War Office.

1 12232

to the adoption of the plan for withdrawal from Palestine we mentioned a suggestion which had occurred to the Foreign Secretary that it might Lt. Gol M. Charterisbe found convenient to transfer to the Iraq or Transjordan Governments part of the stores which we had in Palestine and xx might be useful for the re-equipment of the Iraq and Transjordan armies. I do not know whether this idea was ever pursued. We have announced in Parliament the doctrine that new orders for military equipment from Middle East States will be carefully scrutinised and that the decisive factor will be whether the equipment is likely to be used in Palestine. This decision would seem to make it difficult to supply any war-like stores to Iraq or Transjordan unless they could faitly be represented as deliveries on account of existing and outstanding orders. The same difficulty might however not apply in the case of non-warlike stores.

In the course of discussions leading up

In this connexion the Syrian Minister has also told me that his Government would be very interested in buyding any stores which we might have for disposal in Palestine. He realises that there would be difficulty in supplying warlike stores but thought there might well be other items which would not meet with the same difficulty and the views or

Could you let me know what the War Office views are with regard to either of these suggestions?

OUTTLE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

30th December, 1947.

(E 12232/9373/31)

SECRET.

Dear Stapleton,

In the course of discussions leading up to the adoption of the plan for withdrawal from Palestine we mentioned a suggestion which had occurred to the Foreign Secretary that it might be found convenient to transfer to the Iraq or Transjordan Governments part of the stores which we had in Palestine and which might be useful for the re-equipment of the Iraq and Transjordan armies. I do not know whether this idea was ever pursued. We have announced in Parliament the doctrine that new orders for military equipment from Middle East States will be carefully scrutinised and that the decisive factor will be whether the equipment is likely to be used in Palestine. This decision would seem to make it difficult to supply any war-like stores to Iraq or Transjordan unless they could fairly be represented as deliveries on account of existing and outstanding orders. The same difficulty might however not apply in the case of non-warlike stores.

In this connexion the Syrian Minister has also told me that his Government would be very interested in buying any stores which we might have for disposal in Palestine. He realises that there would be difficulty in supplying warlike stores but thought there might well be other items which would not meet with the same difficulty.

Could you let me know what are the views of the Service Authorities with regard to either of these suggestions? When we have their views the question will naturally have to be carefully reviewed from the political point of view.

(5qd.) L. F. L. Pyman far (B.A.B. Burrows)

D.C. Stapleton, D.F.C., A.F.C.,

22 nd December, 1947 Top Seens You will remember that on the 11th December the Defence bommittee invited the bhigs of Staff to exemine the possibility of transferring control over the part of Tel Aviv to Jurish authorities, in order that they might use it for (from Mr. Bunava) the admission of immigrants, some weeks before the mandate is terminated. you will also have noticed that the Foreign Secretary, answering a question on this subject in the course of his speed in the House of bommons on the 12th December, said: "9 cannot agree to open a post until evo lay down the mandate. We cannot have two administrations It follows from this statement that the control over the pient of Tel Aviv could not be transferred at an

Top Secret.

Gonfidential.

Draft. but W

Group , Path

Stapleton

begy to

W.O

Mr 1 rafford

bolome & you

earlier date than that now contemplated,

namely the 15th May, unless the mandali tself wen laid down in advance of that date. The Foreign Secretary therefor suggests that the blings of Staff Sould modify the terms of reference given to them by the Define bommetter, and that they need only terminating the mandate for Pales time some weeks earlier than the 15th pay a not the possibility of giving up a fewerh port before the end of the Mandate. letter to Sharterisa & safford for, 14



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.,

E 12329/9373/G.

. average You will presenter that on the 11th December the Defence Committee invited the Chiefs of Staff to examine the possibility of transferring control over the port of Tel Aviv to Jewish authorities. in order that they might use it for the admission of immigrants, some weeks before the mandate is terminated.

You will also have noticed that the Foreign Secretary, answering a question on this subject in the course of his speech in the House of Commons on the 12th December, said: "I cannot "agree to open a port until we lay down the "mandate. We cannot have two administrations at "one time".

It follows from this statement that control over the port of Tel Aviv could not be transferred at an earlier date than that now contemplated, namely, the 15th May, unless the mandate itself were laid down in advance of that date. The Foreign Secretary therefore suggests that the Chiefs of Staff need only examine the possibility of terminating the mandate for Palestine some weeks earlier than the 15th May, and not the possibility

Group-Captain D.C. Stapleton, D. F. C. . A. F. C. . Cabinet Offices.

of/

of giving up a Jewish port before the end of the mandate.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charteris and Trafford Smith.

(Signed) B.A.B. Burrows.

29470 F.O.P.

Next Paper.

12363

I have no convents, except that not on strang ground, since

(a). We are going anyway.

(b). There is no sagegrand that the Survivor Geots. will consider theuselves bound by everything the Cavind agree to , tarticularly if any water is not treated in the fundamental hartition drawents. They will contend that au agreements with the IPC were 'agreent public rolling " therefore count be respected.

tenever, we have got to plan this could or

Trough or we can.

I have to quie comments today.

Hnevelyau. 28/12/47

U. W. (P). C. 23.12.

MARGIN WRITTEN NOTHING



GREAT GEORGE STREET,

S.W.I

22nd December, 1947

Dear Trevelyan,

I enclose for you to see a copy of drait paragraphs 5 - 14 inclusive on oil which have been prepared by the Breasury and Ministry of Fuel and Power for inclusion in the report on Palestine.

I should be glad to know by tomorrow that you have no amendments.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Flett at the Treasury and Mr. Monsell Davis, Ministry of Fuel and Power.

Yours sincerely,

E. A. Withmen.

H. Trevelyan, Esq., Foreign Office.

Oil Interests

- 5. Palestine is highly important to the British oil position since oil produced in Iraq by the Iraq Petroleum Company is piped by them across Palestine to the Company's tank farm near Haifa, from which they feed crude oil to the Consolidated Refineries Limited. Approximately 2 million tons per annum of crude oil are now supplied by the Iraq Petroleum Company and 1 million tons each from British Companies in Tripoli and the Persian Gulf. It is hoped that the refining capacity at Haifa will be increased to produce from 7 9 million tons per annum by 1951, using the increased quantities of crude oil which should flow through the new pipe line now under construction.
- 6. The crude oil produced by the Iraq Petroleum Company is owned as to 47½ by British interests, as to 25½ by United States interests, as to 25½ by French interests, and as to 5% by a Mr. Gulbenkian. The Consolidated Refineries Limited are 100% British owned.
- 7. The Iraq Petroleum Company and Consolidated Refineries Limited operate in Palestine under agreements with the Palestine Government due to expire in January, 2001 and October 2003 respectively. In the United Nations Plan of Partition with Economic Union, Chapter 3, paragraph 3(d) stated "Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine before such adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be walld according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State". The operation of the two companies should be protected by this article. The Iraq Petroleum Company have, however, a number of other agreements with the Palestine Government and Municipalities involving such considerations as mining rights, water projects, occupation of land etc. which they would also wish to have safeguarded.
- 8. Because of the shortage in refining capacity throughout the sterling area and the rest of the world, the loss of the refinery at Haifa, or any attempt by the local government to restrict or direct export of petroleum products, or to interfer with imports of machinery, raw materials and crude products, essential both for normal requirements and maintenance of the refinery and pipelines and for expansion schemes, would have a most serious effect on the oil situation in the sterling area Palestine and other neighbouring states draw their requirements of petroleum products from the refinery at Haifa and interference with the production or the products would, therefore, also have serious repercussion on those states. It would also seem to be against the interests of a Jewish successor government in Palestine to take any action which would close Haifa refinery or restrict its activities since this would lose for them an important source of revenue.

/Current

Current annual expenditure by the British Oil Companies on loading dues, taxes, rents, wages, purchase of local materials and capital costs is estimated at abc £5.25 million, and will be considerably higher when the expansion schemes have been completed and are operating.

- 9. At the moment the Refinery Company never owns the oil that it processes. It is remunerated on a fee basis and, as its sole shareholders are the Companies the distribute the refined product, this fee is almost certainly less than would be charged by an outside concern. There is a strong possibility that the successor Government will be attracted by the opportunity of earning hard currency or gold presented by the existence of the refinery on its territory. Assuming that it respects the terms of the convention signed by the Mandatory Government in 1933 it cannot secure an appreciable return from the Company by way of taxation or port dues certainly until 1958 and probably not before the beginning of next century.

 10. The successor government may however attempt to secure an exchange profit either by:-
 - (a) insisting that the Refinery Company increases its processing fee to the full "economic" level and receives some part of the fee in gold or hard currency, or
 - (b) more likely laying down that all oil refined in Palestine must be sold for dollars.

Whether the successor government will really give way to this temptation is unknown. If it did and succeeded the result would be extremely serious. The production of the Haifa refinery will increase during the next few years. If the oil companies have their way the British share alone will be $7\frac{1}{2}$ million tons in 1950 and the difference in cost between the crude oil intake (for which presumably we would charge Palestine dollars in the circumstances envisaged) and refined oil output is of the order of £20 million at present prices.

- 11. Alternative 10(a) therefore would mean our paying a fair proportion of this amount in gold; alternative 10(b) would mean paying in dollars for that proportion of the Haifa output that was consumed in the sterling area.
- 12. On the other hand, we are not without weapons with which to oppose such an attempt by the successor government, e.g. (a) we could refuse to proceed with the expansion of the refinery and the pipe line across Palestine which this involves, (b) refineries wear out pretty quickly and we could in the last resort (and at considerable expense to curselves) transfer the refinery elsewhere, (c) dollar invoicing is a game at which two can play and Palestine must take an appreciable part of her imports from the sterling area.
- 13. For the moment it is difficult to see what can be done to ward off the /prospect

want to delay the expansion of Haifa longer than we are already likely to be forced to delay it by shortages of plant and material. On the other hand if, during the discussions, there is any hint that we are going to be faced with this sort of demand, H.M.G. should have early warning in order to reconsider the policy in regard to the refinery.

Recommendations

- 14. It is recommended that Sir Alexander Cadogan should seek to establish with the United Nations Commission:-
 - (a) that all agreements between the Palestine Government and the Iraq
 Petroleum Company Limited and Consolidated Cil Refineries Limited
 respectively should be treated in accordance with Chapter 3,
 paragraph 3(d) of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, i.e. that
 they shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless
 modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State;
 - (b) that the British oil companies in Palestine should be free to export petroleum products to such destinations as they choose.
 - It is further recommended that Sir A. Cadogan should be asked:-
 - (c) to give early warning of any hint that the Commission may be considering dollar-invoicing the products of the Consolidated Refineries Limited.

Add at end of para.10: the trag Gort have løprersed anxiet about the future of the Harfer refineries & in view of their interest in the expens Tost bogi vil trongh that fort. at some appropriate

THIS MARGIN BE WRITTEN IN NOTHING TO Registry

Top Secret.

Confidential. Restricted.

Secret.

Open.

Draft.

No.

existing and projected pipelines also requires careful examination. And states may well make difficulté over wayleares of fixelines whose terminals are to so in the Ferrish state. American sixe line construction may be difficult in And countries for some une & come

OUT FILE FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.I.

24th December, 1947.

UE.

Your letter of 22nd December with the draft paragraphs 5 - 14 prepared by the Treasury and Ministry of Fuel & Power, for inclusion in the report on Palestine. We suggest the following additions: -

- (1) At the end of paragraph 10: "The Iraq Government have expressed anxiety about the future of the Haifa refineries in view of their interest in the export of Iraqi oil through that port."
- "The effect of the establishment of a Jewish state on the existing and projected pipelines also requires careful examination. Arab states may well make difficulties over wayleaves of pipelines whose terminals are to be in the Jewish state. American pipeline construction may be difficult in Arab countries for some time to come".

I am sending a copy of this letter to Flett and Monsell-Davies.

H.Trevelyan.

E.A.Hitchman, Esq., Gabinet Office.

With Mr. M.T. Flett's compliments.

65

Pat with x Soon.

H.M. TREASURY,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

F

29th December, 1947.

Dear Hitchman,

E1235-1 9373 /21

With reference to your letter of 22nd

December to Trevelyan there is one small alteration

I should like to see made in para. 9 of the

draft note. Our territorial division does not

think that we are justified in saying that there

is a atrong possibility of the Jews trying to


squeeze tokens out of Haifa. Could you emit

"strong" in the fourth line?

I am copying this to Trevelyan and Monsell-Davies.

Yours sincerely,

E.A. Hitchman, Esq., Cabinet Offices.



SO OED HAPE

PUTER ACTOR

TOP GACRET DEY

GREAT GEORGE STREET

S.W.

Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

22nd Lecember, 1947.

E12368

Dear bargent,

You till emember that then the Cabinet on 4th December were considering the plans for the withdrawal of British authority from relectine, on a Memorandum put forward by the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries, they agreed that it tould be advisable to make a "special appointment" for the appoint purpose of supervising the collection in a evacuation of military stores from relestine, and invited the Minister of Defence to arrange for this appointment to be made.

My Minister has seen considering various suggestions for filling this appointment and I hope that a decision ill be reached in the very near future.

Meanwhile, a meeting was held here on loth December to get on with consideration of a directive for the appainted officer: I stick a copy of a brief lote of the meeting, to which is appended a draft directive agreed by representatives of the various departments concerned and mere procent.

Sir Orme Dergent, L.J.E., L.J.M.G.

/I chould

Reference:-



I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether the draft directive is acceptable to the Foreign Office, as the officer selected for this appointment will presumably have to start his work very boon.

Yours sincerely,

Albertan Smith

Ference:-HO** 371 / 61961

SECRET

MISC/M(47)41

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MEETING ON STORES IN PALESTINE

Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room "E", Ministry of Defence, S.W.1, on Thursday 18th December, 1947 at 3-0 p.m.

PRESENT:

Mr. A.J. Newling,
Ministry of Defence. (In the Chair)

Mr. H. Gresswell,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. A. McEwing, Treasury.

Mr. J.G.S, Beith, Foreign Office.

Mr. J. Gutch, Colonial Office.

Mr. G. Moses, Admiralty. Comdr.(S) J.K. Watkins, Admiralty.

Mr. J.R. McGregor, War Office.

Major-General Sir E. Tickell War Office.

Major-General F.W. Festing, War Office.

Brig. Ll. Wansbrough-Jones, War Office.

Lt.-Col. R.J. Dinsmore, War Office.

Mr. E.W. Short,
Air Ministry.

Air Comdre. L. Bates,
Air Ministry.

SECRETARIAT:

Mr. J.F. Hosie.

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC R

7

THE CHAIRMAN explained that the Cabinet had requested the Minister of Defence to give effect to their decision to appoint a special officer who would exercise general supervision over the arrangements for removal and disposal of Services stores from Palestine. The officer had not yet been appointed but a draft directive had been prepared in the Ministry of Defence and the meeting had been called to consider this draft. He proposed and it was agreed that the meeting should first discuss any general considerations which members might wish to raise and then consider the draft in detail.

The representatives of all the Service Departments enquired whether it was the intention that the officer should exercise executive powers and, if so, what form they should take. They pointed out that the arrangements regarding removal of stores were already in operation and that performance of executive powers by the officer would involve duplication of work and staff with a risk of slowing down completion of the task. After discussion, the Meeting were of the opinion that, in view of organisations already in operation the officer's functions would tend to be advisory rather than executive and that he should use the existing organisations.

The Mecting then considered in detail the draft brief. A number of agreed amendments were noted by the Secretariat and have been incorporated in the revised draft directive, a copy of which is attached.

The Meeting, on the suggestion of the Chairman, agreed: -

that the Chairman should submit the draft as amended to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence with a suggestion that it be circulated to the Permanent Secretaries of the Service Departments, the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Transport, for Departmental concurrence.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

19TH DECEMBER, 1947.

REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF SERVICES' STORES FROM PALESTINE

Directive to the Officer appointed to exercise general supervision over the arrangements for removal and disposal

- It is the desire of H.M.G. that the maximum amount of serviceable stores, equipment, plant, machinery and vehicles should be evacuated from Palestine in the time available. In so far as stores, etc. are unserviceable or surplus to Service requirements it is the Government's policy that they should be handed over at the earliest date possible to the Ministry of Supply, except in the case of warlike stores (including ammo.) which are dealt with separately below.
- Your task will be to examine the plans made, the priorities laid down, and the action contemplated in pursuance of them by the Naval, Military and Air Force authorities and to advise whether they represent the best practical means of carrying out the Government's intentions. In this connection you will be concerned, in conjunction with the Palestine Government and the local Naval, Military and Air Force and Ministry of Supply authorities, with every type of store and its disposal whether recovery by the Service concerned for future use, disposal on the spot or to other countries, abandonment or destruction.
- You will have regard in considering priorities for evacuation to the Services' essential needs over the next few years for constructional and accommodation stores of all sorts for housing troops and for machinery, workshop plant, and vehicles; on these priorities you will be advised by the Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply.

You will review the adequacy of the arrangements made for safe removal or where this is not possible for the demilitarisation or destruction of all lethal weapons and ammunition.

Where there is any conflict of opinion between the interested parties as to priority, method or rate of evacuation or disposal of any stores, equipment, etc. the final decision shall rest with you, subject to para 11 below.

The following are the approximate quantities of moveable · stores excluding vehicles now held in Palestine:-

> 5,000 Navy 325,000 Army Air

Force.

31,000 (Subject to confirmation by the Air Ministry).

5. A main difficulty in connection with the removal of stores from Palestine will be limitation of transport, including shipping. It will be your responsibility, in consultation with the Shipping and other Transport authorities, to assess the relative priorities of the different catergories of stores competing for the limited movement facilities. It is understood that a preliminary estimate of the quantities likely to be removable within such transport facilities as at present foreseen are:-

1st Aug. By sea 250,00 tons 29th Feb. Overland 50,000 " plus vehicles.

The Royal Navy hope to be able to provide shipping for their stores.

- 6. The disposal of stores other than warlike stores not required by the Services is the responsibility of the Ministry of Supply. You will satisfy yourself, so far as the Services are concerned that there is no delay in throwing up stores, equipment, etc., which are unserviceable or surplus to requirements and in consultation with the local Ministry of Supply authorities, that arrangements are the made for removal or sale under the most suitable arrangements of the maximum quantities of such stores provided that their sale to particular individuals, agencies, etc., is in conformity with the policy of H.M.G. On this last aspect you should consult, as necessary, the local military authorities and/or (until the termination of the Mandate) the Civil Administration of Palestine.
- 7. You may make recommendations as to the possibility of disposing of warlike stores and equipment to friendly Governments (e.g. Iraq) where suitable transport arrangements are possible. You will receive further instructions as necessary from the Ministry of Defence.
- 8. If it proves impossible either to remove, sell, demilitarise or destroy all stores and equipment before the Forces are withdrawn, arrangements for their safe custody should be completed as far as possible. In that connection you are empowered to negotiate with the United Nations Commission in Palestine, or with Successor Governments, for the collection and safe custody of stores which we desire to remove after the completion of withdrawal, or which we wish to dispose of locally.
- 9. You will acquaint yourself with the local arrangements and powers for dealing with fixed assets of all kinds including the arrangements for their custody after completion of withdrawal. You will be prepared to advise in any major issues of policy which have to be referred home regarding the disposal of major assets.
- 10. Your contacts with the Service authorities will be arranged through the C.s in C. Middle East, who have been advised of the terms of this Directive and have been instructed to afford you all assistance in their power in the discharge of your task. You will contact the H.C.

73

for Palestine matters affecting the Civil Administration prior to the termination of the Mandate. Your contacts with the Ministry of Supply authorities will be arranged through British Supply. Disposal Mission, M.E, and with the Ministry of Transport authorities through , who have also been made aware of the arrangements.

possible on your own initiative in consultation with the authorities mentioned in para 10, you are requested to report any major problems to the Ministry of Defence for decision on matters of general policy or priority. You are also asked to furnish to the Minister of Defence, for the information of the Government, monthly reports of the progress made, furnishing copies to the above - mentioned authorities.

Minister of Defence.

RECORD OFFICE, LONDO

from Sir Orme Sargent

J Orfence

Top Secret.

Confidential.

OUT FILE



OUT FILE

SECRET

5th January, 1948.

75 END

Dear Wilson Smith

May I refer you to your lotter of the 22nd December, enclosing a draft directive to the Officer who will be appointed to supervise the removal and disposal of Services stores from Palestine, which was approved by an inter-legar them tal meeting on the 18th December,

My only comment concerns paragraph 7 of the draft. In view of the serious political implications of any transfer of material to either Arabs or Jews, we should like it clearly laid down that the Foreign Secretary shall be consulted before any proposal is adopted for the disposal of stores or equipment for the disposal of stores or equipment to foreign Governments.

The draft is otherwise acceptable to the Foreign Office.

Your sincerely, O.G. Sargent.

Sir Henry Wilson-Smith, K. B. a., Ministry of Defence.

GHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, L

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group. 50

Class 37/

Piece 6/96/

Following document(s)*

retained in the Department of origin*

transferred to PRO Safe Room*

E 12397 /9373/31

and closed	until	19	9	8	
and closed	umul				

*delete as necessary